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dominated neighborhoods such as Bronzeville and Pilsen,
they remain unconvinced that the regular residents
(rather than housing speculators) beneﬁted considerably.
Indeed, many former residents of these neighborhoods
found themselves priced out by gentriﬁcation.
Collectively, these three works suggest that scholars
should pay considerably more attention to the distribu-
tional consequences of urban redevelopment and criti-
cally reexamine the extent to which improvements in the
built environment actually trickle down to beneﬁt the
people who reside there—particularly the most vulnerable
among them.
The Great Exception: The New Deal and the Limits of
American Politics. By Jefferson Cowie. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2016. 273p. $27.95 cloth, $19.95 paper.
doi:10.1017/S1537592717002419
— Lane Kenworthy, University of California, San Diego
How should we understand the place of the New Deal
era, 1935 to 1978, in the evolution of America’s political
economy? Jefferson Cowie, author of a lively and insightful
earlier book on labor’s decline in the 1970s (Stayin’ Alive
2010), offers a new take on this much-debated question.
The Great Exception advances three core arguments.
First, America’s economic institutions (extensive corporate
power), political structure (numerous veto points), and
culture (individualism and antistatism) impose formidable
barriers to the enactment of progressive government
policies. According to Cowie, these obstacles were
surmounted in the New Deal era due to a particular
balance of forces: Labor was well organized and politically
active; relatively liberal Democrats held considerable sway
in the federal government’s legislative and executive
branches; and the ascendance of Keynesianism among
economists, the immigration restrictions put in place in
the 1920s, and a tacit pact on race muted the inﬂuence on
policymakers of individualism, small government senti-
ment, and racial and ethnic divisiveness.
Cowie’s second argument is that New Deal liberal-
ism’s hegemony was shallow and fragile. By the 1980s,
labor had weakened, a small-government Republican
was in the White House, income inequality was on the
rise, and New Deal programs were under attack. This,
he says, is because the New Deal coalition limited its
focus to government programs. It had no coherent
strategy pointing toward fundamental shifts in eco-
nomic institutions (an attack on corporate power) or
culture (an attack on individualism). Franklin Roosevelt
argued for such a strategy in his Second Inaugural
Address in 1937, suggesting that the country needed
to reduce economic inequality in order to safeguard
political equality and offering a new conception of
individual rights based on economic security. But
Roosevelt abandoned these themes relatively quickly,
and neither he nor the New Deal coalition returned to
them. In Cowie’s telling, the compromises the New
Deal coalition made with corporate capitalism and with
individualism left it vulnerable to internal divisions
(between segments of the coalition and within the
Democratic Party), to economic downturn (stagﬂation
and slower economic growth), to structural economic
change (manufacturing decline), to weakening of key
members of the coalition (union decline), to bad policy
choices (Vietnam), and to renewed energy and organiz-
ing by opponents (business, free-market economists,
conservative Christians, and others).
Cross-country comparison offers grounds for skepti-
cism about Cowie’s argument here. Consider the British
case. The Labour Party in the 1970s was committed to
the transformative goal of nationalizing the means of
production, and it operated in a less individualistic, less
antistatist cultural environment. Yet its policy strategy and
political fortunes in the ensuing decades look similar to
those of American liberals.
Think, too, of Sweden’s Social Democratic Party,
which has long embraced a solidaristic and egalitarian
orientation. In the 1970s and early 1980s, on the heels of
four decades of electoral dominance, it signed on to a plan
to shift ownership of ﬁrms into public hands via
“wage-earner funds.” Yet the party has struggled electorally
since then, and it now emphasizes employment and
ﬂexibility more than decommodiﬁcation or industrial
democracy.
Germany has a law allowing employees to elect half the
board of directors in large ﬁrms; it has strong unions; it
has limited racial and ethnic divisions; and it is not
plagued by an individualist, small-government culture.
Yet in recent decades, collective bargaining in Germany
has weakened signiﬁcantly, and a social-democratic
government enacted policy changes that did away with
a key element of the unemployment insurance system
and facilitated the emergence of a large low-wage segment
of the labor market.
Consider also the California experience. Like much of
America, this state, with a population of 40 million (more
than the Nordic countries combined), features little
restraint on corporate power, high top-end income
inequality, weak unions, racial and ethnic heterogeneity,
and an individualistic culture. Yet since 2004, California
has adopted paid parental leave, paid sickness leave,
a more generous Earned Income Tax Credit for the
lowest earners, a supplemental deﬁned-contribution pen-
sion program with automatic enrollment, a $15-per-hour
minimum wage (to be fully phased in by 2022), and
more.
The Great Exception’s third argument is that not only
New Deal liberalism’s hegemony but also some of its
signature achievements have proved ephemeral. Since
1978, says Cowie, the United States has drifted “back to
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a contemporary version of Grover Cleveland’s America”
(p. 29). It has not simply stopped advancing; it has
regressed.
This seems correct in three respects: Labor unions are
weak (the unionization rate has fallen to about the same
level as in 1933), the Democratic Party no longer
dominates national politics, and income inequality be-
tween the top 1% of Americans and everyone else has
risen sharply (to pre-1930s levels). And in one respect,
the present era may be worse than its pre–New Deal
counterpart: Wages for workers in the middle and below
have been ﬂat for four decades.
At the same time, there have been important, lasting
improvements. Americans are more economically secure
due to an array of public insurance programs—Social
Security, unemployment insurance, disability beneﬁts,
Medicare and Medicaid, food stamps, the Earned Income
Tax Credit, and more. For instance, in 1935 only 6%
of Americans had health insurance, whereas today 91%
do, almost all of them via a government program
(Medicare, Medicaid, and the Veteran’s Administration)
or a government-subsidized employer-provided plan. We
have a much higher wage and income ﬂoor. The poverty
rate, likely greater than 50% prior to the mid-1930s, is
now about 15%, and even that understates the gains in
living standards for the least well-off. In the mid-1930s,
about 45% of Americans were homeowners; today 65%
are. Although we are not doing as well as we should on
equality of opportunity, we are surely ahead of where we
were in 1935. Funding inequality across K–12 public
schools and districts is much less unequal; more families
who do not have access to a good public school can choose
a charter alternative; and 65% of a typical cohort enters
college, including 30% of those whose parents’ income is
in the bottom ﬁfth.
What of the present and future? According to Cowie,
the “most urgent of projects” is to reduce economic
inequality (p. 32), because it leads to political dominance
by elites and because it correlates with “a host of negative
outcomes, including shorter life expectancy, higher in-
fant mortality, higher incarceration rates, lower levels of
trust, higher rates of mental illness, more crime, and
truncated social mobility” (p. 221). Here, too, we need to
be clear about what the evidence says. While top-end
income inequality has returned to pre–New Deal levels,
that is not true of inequality more broadly. Gender and
racial gaps in schooling, jobs, and incomes have decreased
signiﬁcantly, as Cowie notes. The effective federal tax rate
on the top 1% of taxpayers was the same in 2013 as in
1979 (cuts by Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush were
canceled out by hikes under George H. W. Bush, Bill
Clinton, and Barack Obama). Wealth inequality almost
certainly is a good bit lower than pre-1935. For all of the
justiﬁable concern about inequality of political inﬂuence,
we lack systematic evidence that corporations and the
richest Americans have more control over policy deci-
sions now than they did a generation ago, much less
a century ago. And the empirical case that income
inequality is bad for health, safety, and other social
outcomes is thin at best.
Cowie’s arguments imply that enacting public social
programs will not secure much in the way of sustained
progress for ordinary Americans unless coupled with
a signiﬁcant weakening of corporate power, economic
inequality, and individualism. While I am not per-
suaded, it is a reasonable hypothesis. And The Great
Exception is an engaging, thoughtful, provocative con-
tribution.
Diversity Matters: Judicial Policy Making in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals. By Susan B. Haire and Laura P. Moyer.
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2015. 200p. $45.00.
doi:10.1017/S1537592717002420
— Rachel Paine Caufield, Drake University
For the past six decades, the subﬁeld of judicial politics
has adopted an overarching focus on the determinants of
judicial decision making. During that time period,
a dramatic change has taken place in American court-
rooms as individuals from traditionally underrepresented
groups have been selected to serve as judges. In this
important new work, Susan Haire and Laura Moyer
admirably undertake a comprehensive examination of the
growing number of women and minority judges
appointed to the U.S. Courts of Appeals to determine
how diversiﬁcation has altered decision making on these
courts.
Diversity Matters is theoretically nuanced; insights
from social psychology, critical race and gender studies,
and organizational theory are seamlessly integrated with
existing political science scholarship. In a chapter on
panel diversity, the authors develop hypotheses based on
“expectations states theory” (which argues that when
called upon to operate in small groups, individuals’
expectations are based on relative status within the social
hierarchy) and “superadditivity” (which proposes that
diverse groups will engage in more thorough information
processing), both theories borrowed from recent social
psychological research that is only beginning to be fully
appreciated by political science (pp. 83–85). Similarly,
they adopt a theory of “group identity” in their explora-
tion of race and ethnicity, drawing on biographical
information to derive differing expectations for African
American and Latino judges. A “different voice” frame-
work is used to examine the role of women judges (p. 34),
and the authors examine the idea of “critical mass theory”
and “critical actors” in their chapter focusing on circuit
diversity (p. 102). The inclusion of these theoretical
perspectives provides a fresh lens through which to view
judicial decision making.
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